By: Iain Martin

It was the worst day for American forces in Afghanistan in four years yesterday, with 14 lives lost, all in helicopter crashes.

Speaking during a visit to Naval Air Station Jacksonville on the same day, the president said: “While I will never hesitate to use force to protect the American people or our vital interests, I also promise you this — and this is very important as we consider our next steps in Afghanistan: I will never rush the solemn decision of sending you into harm’s way. I won’t risk your lives unless it is absolutely necessary.”

His audience approved and for entirely understandable reasons. They are in uniform and may have to deal with the practical consequences when “armchair generals” and civilian hawks sitting at home demand they be sent into action. But while it sounds considered and eminently reasonable, I’m not sure that the “no rush” approach on the next stage of this campaign does anyone – the U.S. military, America’s allies such as Britain or the Afghan people – much good.

I do not mean to suggest that Monday’s tragic deaths would have been avoided if there were more forces on the ground. However, there is a sense that we – the West – are in limbo in the war against the Taliban. Great sacrifices are being made by our forces while our leaders cannot work out whether or not to commit fully to backing them in getting the job done.

The president appears to be hedging. He has recommendations on his desk from Gen. Stanley McChrystal, his senior Afghan commander, that there should be a surge of 40,000 troops. But the suggestion is that he may listen instead to Sen. John Kerry, chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, who says McChrystal wants to go “too far, too fast.” In this way, the president may opt for half-measures, or a semisurge, so fearful is he of being sucked into a Vietnam scenario in the manner of LBJ.

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Commander Prefers 40,000 for Afghanistan, but His Report Gives Obama 3 Options

By Peter Spiegel and Yochi Dreazen

The request for troops sent to President Barack Obama by the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan includes three different options, with the largest alternative including a request for more than 60,000 troops, according to a U.S. official familiar with the document.

Although the top option is more than the 40,000 soldiers previously understood to be the top troop total sought by Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. officer in Kabul, 40,000 remains the primary choice of senior military brass, including Gen. McChrystal, the official said.

The details of the three scenarios were first reported by ABC News and confirmed by the U.S. official. The third option presented to Mr. Obama would be only a small increase that would keep U.S. forces largely at their year-end levels of 68,000 troops.

The troop request is expected to be deliberated today at Mr. Obama’s fifth cabinet-level meeting of his war council amid indications of growing official unease about such a significant escalation.

Although most requests for forces include only a single troop figure, Pentagon officials have acknowledged that Gen. McChrystal’s request was unusual given the continuing review of Afghan strategy. It is rather common in military planning, however, to discuss three different scenarios in order to illustrate why the middle option is preferable option.

Gen. McChrystal has warned that the U.S. faces possible “mission failure” in Afghanistan unless it quickly sends large numbers of forces there. But the Obama administration faces growing hurdles even if it decides to go with a buildup of tens of thousands of troops.

Senior Army officers acknowledged in interviews, for instance, that the U.S. doesn’t have nearly enough helicopters in Afghanistan to meet the current demand for safe movement of troops around the country. And U.S. forces are just beginning to receive new vehicles meant to function better on Afghanistan’s poor roads.

Separately, a recent study by the Institute for the Study of War — a Washington, D.C., think tank headed by Kimberly Kagan, a military analyst who worked on Gen. McChrystal’s assessment team — suggested it would be difficult to move enough troops from other posts to deploy anywhere close to 40,000 troops before next summer at the earliest.

The military agrees with the institute’s overall findings, although has identified different units it could deploy over the course of the next year.

White House officials acknowledged that Mr. Obama’s review is centering on ensuring the war is focused on preventing al Qaeda’s return to Afghanistan — a narrower objective that could require fewer, if any, new American troops. The officials acknowledged that the administration’s strategic review no longer sees the U.S.’s primary mission in Afghanistan as completely defeating the Taliban or preventing the armed Islamist group from any involvement in the country’s future.

Despite the narrowed focus, several White House officials said the administration’s broad review is ongoing and that the president hasn’t made any decisions. They said Mr. Obama wants to decide on what military strategy to pursue before approving or rejecting Gen. McChrystal’s request.

Still, focusing the U.S. mission in Afghanistan solely on destroying al Qaeda could make it easier for Mr. Obama to make a public case for giving Gen. McChrystal the lowest end of his three options, which would amount to only a small increase.

Political support for the war has been rapidly eroding among the public and on Capitol Hill, even as Gen. McChrystal and the nation’s top military personnel argue for a counterinsurgency strategy designed to protect Afghan civilians.

At the center of the ongoing deliberations, according to officials involved in and briefed on the White House sessions, is an emerging belief that a broad effort to defeat the Taliban and shore up Afghanistan’s weak central government may not be necessary to counter the threat posed by al Qaeda.

White House officials familiar with deliberations said that while some elements of the Taliban were inclined to harbor al Qaeda, which operated freely in Afghanistan through 2001, other members were focused on Afghanistan’s internal politics and much less likely to support the international terror group.

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